





TO STOP OR NOT TO STOP:  THE APPLICATION OR 
MISAPPLICATION OF HENSLEY TO COMPLETED 
MISDEMEANORS 
Cecilia R. Byrne*
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A police officer receives a citizen complaint that an individual has 
been playing his car stereo at an excessive volume.  The next day, the 
officer sees a person matching the description from the complaint 
driving down the freeway.  Should the officer be allowed to pull this 
individual over on suspicion of having committed a misdemeanor 
noise violation?  Should there be a bright-line rule against allowing 
vehicle stops to investigate completed misdemeanors?  Or, should the 
validity of an investigatory stop be determined by a balancing of the 
individual’s and the government’s interests on a case by case basis, 
taking into account the threat to public safety posed by the com-
pleted misdemeanor? 
“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants consti-
tute[s] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of” the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, even if “the purpose of the stop is limited and the re-
sulting detention quite brief.”1  However, in Terry v. Ohio, the Su-
preme Court held that some warrantless intrusions upon the consti-
tutionally protected interests of citizens are permissible.2  The 
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 1 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“[C]heckpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (“The 
Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve 
only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”). 
 2 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“conclud[ing] that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to 
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he 
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regard-
less of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”). 
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standard of permissibility is whether the police officer is “able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion.”3  Thus, Terry established the “specific and articulable facts” 
standard, premised upon the requirement of imminent or ongoing 
criminal activity, as an exception to the warrant requirement. 
In United States v. Hensley, the Court decided that the Fourth 
Amendment allows police officers to conduct Terry stops if they “have 
a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, 
that a person they encounter . . . is wanted in connection with a com-
pleted felony.”4  However, the Court in Hensley stopped short of de-
ciding whether or not this ruling further extends to completed mis-
demeanors.5
This Comment examines the court decisions that address whether 
the Hensley holding also applies to completed misdemeanors.  The 
Comment argues that the Court’s holding in Hensley should extend to 
these misdemeanors and that the validity of Terry stops should be de-
termined on a case by case basis. 
In Parts II and III, this Comment examines decisions by federal 
and state courts that address this issue left unanswered by the Su-
preme Court in Hensley.  In Part IV, this Comment argues that there 
should not be a bright-line rule against allowing Terry stops to investi-
gate completed misdemeanors.  Instead, the Court’s holding in 
Hensley should extend to past misdemeanors and the validity of Terry 
stops should be determined by a balancing of the individual’s and the 
government’s interests on a case by case basis.  In applying the Fourth 
Amendment balancing test, the Supreme Court has “consistently es-
chewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature 
of the reasonableness inquiry.”6  Rather than using the distinction be-
tween completed felonies and completed misdemeanors (both of 
which can threaten public safety) as the basis for ruling on the legal-
 3 Id. at 21. 
 4 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). 
 5 See id. (“We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past 
crimes, however serious, are permitted.”); see also George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory De-
tentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 873–74 (1985) (“In United States v. 
Hensley, the Court carefully reserved the question whether ‘all past crimes, however seri-
ous’ permit nonarrest detentions on less than probable cause.” (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. 
at 229)). 
 6 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Green v. State, 348 So. 2d 428, 429 
(Miss. 1977) (“Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has ever 
been able to articulate a concrete rule to determine what circumstances might justify an 
investigatory stop.”). 
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ity of investigatory stops, the use of a balancing test would allow 
courts to determine whether a particular misdemeanor poses a seri-
ous risk to public safety.7  For example, it would be unnecessary to 
differentiate between a case in which a citizen reports seeing an indi-
vidual driving erratically and police officers believe the individual is 
intoxicated from a case in which the police officers themselves see 
the erratic driving, if the officers believe both situations pose an 
equal threat to public safety. 
Finally, Part V of this Comment argues that stops to investigate 
completed misdemeanors should only be used as a means to protect 
the public and not as a tool to solve crimes.  Public safety is the only 
government interest that would warrant the invasive intrusion into an 
individual’s privacy rights resulting from stops to investigate past mis-
demeanors. 
II.  FEDERAL CASE LAW:  THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, AND TENTH 
CIRCUITS CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE LEFT UNANSWERED IN 
HENSLEY 
To date, four circuits have addressed the issue left unanswered in 
United States v. Hensley.8  In Hensley, police officers made an investiga-
tive stop of a person named in a “wanted flyer” they had received sev-
eral days earlier.  After opening the car door, the officer observed a 
revolver protruding from underneath the passenger’s seat.  The sus-
pect was arrested and subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury 
for being a convicted felon in possession of firearms.9  The Supreme 
Court decided that the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to 
conduct Terry stops if they “have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in 
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter [is] in-
volved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony.”10  The 
Court held that the proper way to determine the validity of these in-
vestigatory stops is to apply the same Fourth Amendment balancing 
test “already used to identify the proper bounds of intrusions that fur-
 7 See generally Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 117 (Miss. 1999) (“The ques-
tion is not whether a driver is suspected of a felony or misdemeanor, but whether a law 
enforcement officer acts reasonably in stopping a vehicle to investigate a complaint short 
of arrest.”); William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 811 (1993) (“[I]n Tennessee v. Garner, the Court characterized 
the felony/misdemeanor distinction as ‘highly technical,’ ‘minor,’ and ‘arbitrary.’  The 
Court observed that many misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than that in-
volved in many felonies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 8 469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
 9 Id. at 225. 
 10 Id. at 229. 
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ther investigations of imminent or ongoing crimes.”11  This test 
weighs “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus-
tify the intrusion.”12
However, the Court in Hensley stopped short of deciding whether 
or not their ruling—that the Fourth Amendment allows police offi-
cers to conduct Terry stops if they have a reasonable suspicion, 
grounded in specific facts, that the person was involved or is wanted 
in connection with a completed felony—extends to completed mis-
demeanors.13  The Court explicitly stated:  “We need not and do not 
decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, how-
ever serious, are permitted.”14
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to examine this issue.15  In 
2004, in Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford, the Sixth Circuit created a 
bright-line prohibition against stops based on the reasonable suspi-
cion of a “mere completed misdemeanor.”16  In this case, the arrestee 
was alleged to have been driving erratically and to have been slump-
ing in the car seat.  The police officers stated they suspected he was 
intoxicated, in violation of Michigan law.  When they stopped him, 
the officers testified that the arrestee jumped out of the car with a 
knife, although the arrestee denied having any knife.17
The court summarized the state of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence in the Sixth Circuit and held:  
Police may make an investigative stop of a vehicle when they have rea-
sonable suspicion of an ongoing crime, whether it be a felony or misde-
meanor, including drunk driving in jurisdictions where that is a criminal 
offense.  Police may also make a stop when they have reasonable suspi-
cion of a completed felony, though not of a mere completed misde-
meanor.18
 11 Id. at 228; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the 
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”); 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 n.7, 698–701 (1981) (reinforcing the idea of a 
balancing test between intrusions on Fourth Amendment interests and governmental in-
terests). 
 12 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228. 
 13 Id. at 229; see also Dix, supra note 5, at 873–74. 
 14 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229; see also Dix, supra note 5, at 873–74 (“In United States v. Hensley, 
the Court carefully reserved the question whether ‘all past crimes, however serious’ per-
mit nonarrest detentions on less than probable cause.” (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 
229)). 
 15 Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 16 Id. at 771 n.6. 
 17 Id. at 766–67. 
 18 Id. at 771 n.6 (citations omitted). 
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The Ninth Circuit was the next circuit to consider this issue.19  In 
2007, in United States v. Grigg, the Ninth Circuit refused the per se 
standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit three years prior.20  In this case, 
police officers discovered an unregistered firearm while conducting 
an investigative stop of the defendant pursuant to a citizen’s com-
plaint that the defendant had been playing his car stereo at excessive 
volume earlier in the day.21  The court in Grigg instructed “that a re-
viewing court must consider the nature of the misdemeanor offense 
in question, with particular attention to the potential for ongoing or 
repeated danger (e.g., drunken or reckless driving), and any risk of 
escalation (e.g., disorderly conduct, assault, domestic violence).”22  It 
further held: 
An assessment of the “public safety” factor should be considered within 
the totality of the circumstances, when balancing the privacy interests at 
stake against the efficacy of a Terry stop, along with the possibility that the 
police may have alternative means to identify the suspect or achieve the 
investigative purpose of the stop.23
In the same year, the Tenth Circuit also refused a bright-line pro-
hibition against Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors.24  
In United States v. Moran, the Tenth Circuit followed the same reason-
ing applied by the Ninth Circuit in Grigg and held that, in order to 
determine the constitutionality of an investigatory stop, courts must 
balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus-
tify the intrusion.”25  In this case, the defendant’s car was stopped by 
 19 United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 20 Id. at 1081. 
 21 Id. at 1072–73. 
 22 Id. at 1081. 
 23 Id.; see also Aaron Steinberg, Terry Stop of a Vehicle to Investigate a Completed Misdemeanor 
Crime:  U.S. v. Grigg, a Case of First Impression in the Ninth Circuit, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 207, 
219 (2009) (explaining that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Grigg emphasized that an in-
dividual’s Fourth Amendment interest varies according to the circumstances of the stop” 
and noting that, in this way, the court demonstrated “that there is some obligation on the 
part of an officer to use less intrusive means of investigating a completed petty offense, 
rather than merely stopping a suspect for questioning when other means of investigation 
existed”). 
 24 United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Rachel S. Chase, 
Case Comment, Criminal Procedure—Tenth Circuit Authorizes Investigatory Stops Based on Past 
Misdemeanor Offenses—United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2007), 42 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 259, 266 (2008) (“In United States v. Moran, the Tenth Circuit considered the 
constitutionality of investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion of a past misde-
meanor.  The court’s decision to apply a fact-specific balancing test comports with the 
constitutional limits of the Fourth Amendment and remains consistent with the majority 
of circuit courts that have addressed the issue.”). 
 25 Moran, 503 F.3d at 1141 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985)). 
1196 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
police officers, who found a loaded shotgun inside, after landowners 
reported him trespassing in order to reach a public hunting area.26  
The Moran court noted that “the governmental interest in crime pre-
vention and detection, necessarily implicated in a stop to investigate 
ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, may not be present when of-
ficers are investigating past criminal conduct,” and determined that 
the governmental interest in “solving crimes and bringing offenders 
to justice” is particularly strong when the criminal activity involves a 
threat to public safety.27
Finally, in 2008, the Eighth Circuit weighed in on the issue left 
unanswered in Hensley.28  In United States v. Hughes, the Eighth Circuit 
followed the examples set by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and re-
fused a per se standard prohibiting police from conducting Terry 
stops on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and 
articulable facts, that a person was involved or is wanted in connec-
tion with a completed misdemeanor.29  In this case, the defendant, 
who was later charged with being a felon in possession of ammuni-
tion, was stopped and searched because he was standing near a bus 
stop in a high crime area and he matched the description given by 
the police dispatcher of someone who had recently committed crimi-
nal trespass.30
In Hughes, the court followed the balancing test used in Hensley to 
determine the validity of the investigatory stop at issue and noted that 
“[u]nder this test, the nature of the misdemeanor and potential 
threats to citizens’ safety are important factors.”31  When the Eighth 
Circuit applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test to the facts at 
issue in the case, it held that the governmental interest in investigat-
ing an earlier trespass did not outweigh the defendant’s individual 
interest of being free from arbitrary interference by the police.32
Thus, only one out of four circuits to address this issue has 
adopted a bright-line prohibition against Terry stops to investigate 
 26 Id. at 1138–39. 
 27 Id. at 1142 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228–29). 
 28 See United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Terry 
stop may be justified if a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has been 
committed, but the stop and frisk at issue was not a justified Terry stop). 
 29 See id. at 1017 (holding that specific and articulable facts can support and justify reason-
able suspicion for a Terry stop). 
 30 Id. at 1015–16. 
 31 Id. at 1017; accord United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (2007); Moran, 503 F.3d at 
1141. 
 32 See Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1018. 
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completed misdemeanors.33  While the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have all extended the Court’s holding in Hensley to reach to 
prior misdemeanors, they have refused a per se rule.34  These circuits 
determine the constitutionality of Terry stops to investigate completed 
misdemeanors by balancing the individual’s and government’s inter-
ests on a case by case basis.35
III.  STATE CASE LAW:  INCONSISTENCY IN STATE COURT DECISIONS 
REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW TERRY STOPS TO 
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS 
In addition to federal court decisions, state court decisions are 
important to consider in evaluating whether or not to allow Terry 
stops to investigate completed misdemeanors.  State court decisions 
shed light on the importance of civil rights because states have the 
option to protect individual liberties above and beyond what federal 
law allows.  In August of 1986, Justice William Brennan praised state 
court actions in a speech to the ABA’s Section of Individual Rights 
and Responsibilities and stressed the importance of considering state 
court decisions in the evaluation of American law.  Brennan stated: 
[The] rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections af-
forded their own citizens by their state constitutions—spawned in part 
certainly by dissatisfaction with the decisional law being announced these 
days by the United States Supreme Court—is probably the most impor-
tant development in constitutional jurisprudence in our times.  For state 
constitutional law will assume an increasingly more visible role in Ameri-
can law in the years ahead.36
Thus, it is important to consider all cases, both state and federal, in 
order to make an informed evaluation of the reasonableness of Terry 
stops to investigate completed misdemeanors. 
Many state courts have addressed the issue left unanswered in 
Hensley and, like the federal courts of appeals, have come to different 
conclusions about whether or not to allow Terry stops to investigate 
completed misdemeanors.37  Both the Court of Appeals of Minnesota 
and the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, have adopted a 
 33 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1018; Moran, 503 F.3d at 1141; Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081. 
 35 See supra note 34. 
 36 Paul Marcotte, Federalism and the Rise of State Courts, 73 A.B.A. J. 60, 64 (1987).  
 37 See, generally, State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Burgess, 
776 A.2d 1223 (Me. 2001); Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110 (Miss. 1999); City of Devils 
Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 2002); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash. 
2002). 
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bright-line prohibition against allowing police to stop vehicles in or-
der to investigate past misdemeanors.38
In 1985, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota concluded in Blaisdell 
v. Commissioner of Public Safety that “the limited benefits to the public 
interest resulting from warrantless vehicle stops to investigate past 
misdemeanors do not outweigh the intrusion on the ‘motorists’ right 
to free passage without interruption.’”39  In this case, a clerk at a ser-
vice station reported that a car, which was driven by a licensee, had 
been involved in a “no-pay” theft two months earlier.  An officer 
stopped the licensee’s car and only then noticed that the licensee ap-
peared to be intoxicated.  After failing a preliminary breath test, the 
licensee was arrested for DWI.40
The Minnesota court in Blaisdell held that all vehicle stops to in-
vestigate past misdemeanors violate the Fourth Amendment41 and 
emphasized that automobile stops to investigate completed misde-
meanors do not advance the governmental interest in solving crimes, 
since the owner of a car can be easily identified by looking up the li-
cense plate numbers of the vehicle.42  The court concluded by stating:  
“While we can envision situations where an automobile stop could 
advance the public interest to a greater degree than the present stop, 
we do not believe this will arise in a misdemeanor context with suffi-
cient frequency to appreciably advance the public interest in solving 
past crimes.”43
In 1988, the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, followed 
the 1985 ruling of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Blaisdell and 
crafted a per se rule prohibiting police from stopping vehicles to in-
vestigate past misdemeanors.44  Indeed, in State v. Bennett, the Florida 
appellate court affirmed an order of the trial court holding that stops 
to investigate suspects of completed misdemeanors are not permissi-
ble.45
 38 See Bennett, 520 So. 2d at 636 (accepting trial court’s findings in favor of a bright-line pro-
hibition); Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883–84 (rejecting “warrantless vehicle stops to investi-
gate past misdemeanors”). 
 39 Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883–84 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
557–58 (1976)). 
 40 Id. at 881. 
 41 Id. at 884; accord Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557–58 (stating that checkpoint stops do in-
trude to a limited extent on motorists’ rights to “free passage without interruption” 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). 
 42 Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that “stops to 
investigate suspects of past misdemeanors are not permissible”). 
 45 Id. 
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In contrast to the rulings of the appellate courts in Minnesota and 
Florida, other states have rejected a per se rule prohibiting Terry stops 
to investigate past misdemeanors.46  In 1986, in State v. Myers, the 
Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Second Circuit, applied the Fourth 
Amendment balancing test to analyze the constitutionality of a vehi-
cle stop to investigate the suspect of a completed misdemeanor.47  In 
this case, the defendant’s car was stopped by an officer who had re-
ceived a teletype message to be on the lookout for a vehicle whose 
description matched the defendant’s.  The vehicle in question was 
distinctive and had been seen running a stop sign earlier in the day.  
After stopping the defendant, the officer discovered that the defen-
dant had been driving under the influence of alcohol.48  In Myers, the 
court held that a teletype message notifying officers to be on the 
lookout for a vehicle whose description matched the defendant’s 
provided the police officer with reasonable cause to stop the defen-
dant for the limited purpose of checking the driver’s identification—
a purpose which could not be accomplished simply by looking at the 
license plate.49  The Louisiana court ruled that the police may stop 
any person whom an officer reasonably suspects of committing an of-
fense, be it a felony or a misdemeanor, and ask for the person’s 
name, address, and an explanation of his actions.50
In State v. Blankenship, a victim reported that the defendant’s car 
was involved in an accident with hers, that it left the scene of the ac-
cident, and that the driver was intoxicated.  Defendant contended 
that the initial stop of his automobile was unlawful, and therefore the 
evidence of intoxication should have been suppressed.51  The Court 
of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee held that “some intrusions upon 
the constitutionally protected interests of citizens [are] permissible.  
The standard of permissibility is whether the police officer is ‘able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion.’”52  The court applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test to 
the case at issue and concluded that the information provided to the 
police officer met the “‘specific and articulable facts’” standard, and 
 46 See generally State v. Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223 (Me. 2001); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 
749 So. 2d 110 (Miss. 1999); City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d. 466 (N.D. 
2002); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash. 2002). 
 47 State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 48 Id. at 701–02. 
 49 Id. at 703. 
 50 Id. at 703–04. 
 51 State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). 
 52 Id. at 356 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 
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thus the officer was justified, based on this information, in stopping 
the defendant’s vehicle to investigate the completed crime.53
 Many other states have also adopted the Fourth Amendment bal-
ancing test to determine the validity of Terry stops to investigate com-
pleted misdemeanors.54  In 1999, in Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, a de-
fendant was arrested after an individual reported to the police that 
the defendant was driving at high speed and in a reckless manner.  
The defendant argued that, because reckless driving is a misde-
meanor and because the officer did not himself observe the defen-
dant driving in a reckless manner, the stop was unlawful.55  The Su-
preme Court of Mississippi applied the “specific and articulable facts” 
standard from Terry as a test of reasonableness in holding that a vehi-
cle stop by a police officer was justified.56  In State v. Burgess in 2001, a 
witness reported having seen the defendant driving while intoxicated.  
Two days later, the officer returned to the area where the witness had 
seen the defendant and stopped the defendant’s car, which matched 
the description from the report.  The officer observed no evidence of 
erratic driving, but the defendant failed a sobriety test.57  The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine held: 
An investigatory stop is justified if at the time of the stop the officer has 
an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct has taken place, is occur-
ring, or imminently will occur, and the officer’s assessment of the exis-
tence of specific and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop is ob-
 53 Id. 
 54 See State v. Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223, 1227 (Me. 2001) (“‘An investigatory stop is justified if 
at the time of the stop the officer has an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct . . .  
is . . . or imminently will occur, and the officer’s assessment of the existence of specific 
and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop is objectively reasonable in the totality 
of the circumstances.’” (quoting State v. Tarvers, 709 A.2d 726, 727 (Me. 1998)); Floyd v. 
City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 114 (Miss. 1999) (“In determining whether there 
exists the requisite ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts,’ the 
court must consider whether, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the 
detaining officers had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity.’” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–
18 (1981)); City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d 466, 469–71 (N.D. 2002) (listing 
factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of stopping a motor vehicle or pos-
sible offender); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 516–18 (Wash. 2002) (“‘[T]he nature and 
quality of the intrusion on personal security [should be balanced] against the importance 
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985)). 
 55 See Floyd, 749 So. 2d at 114 (“Floyd contends that because reckless driving is a misde-
meanor and because Officer Palmer did not personally observe Floyd driving in a reckless 
manner, the stop . . . was unlawful as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unreasonable search and seizure.”). 
 56 See id. at 114 (elaborating on the “specific and articulable facts” standard set forth in Ter-
ry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
 57 Burgess, 776 A.2d at 1226. 
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jectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.  Thus, an officer 
has the authority to make an investigatory stop as a crime prevention or 
detection function.58
And, in 2002, the Supreme Courts of both North Dakota and 
Washington used a totality of the circumstances approach in evaluat-
ing the validity of a Terry stop to investigate a past misdemeanor.59  
Finally, Texas, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania also all use the bal-
ancing test adopted in Hensley to determine the validity of Terry stops 
to investigate completed misdemeanors, and have thus rejected a per 
se standard against such stops.60
IV.  REJECTION OF A PER SE STANDARD AND ADOPTION OF THE 
BALANCING TEST APPLIED IN HENSLEY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF 
TERRY STOPS TO INVESTIGATE COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS 
The Court in Hensley chose not to decide whether it is constitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment for police officers to conduct 
investigatory stops if they have reasonable suspicion that the person 
was involved in a completed misdemeanor.61  However, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s prior application of the Fourth Amendment balanc-
ing test, policy considerations regarding public safety, and the lack of 
a clear and meaningful distinction in the common law between felo-
nies and misdemeanors, the holding in Hensley should apply not only 
to completed felonies, but also to completed misdemeanors. 
 58 Id. at 1227 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Tarvers, 709 A.2d at 
727). 
 59 See City of Devils Lake, 639 N.W.2d. at 469 (“In determining whether an investigative stop is 
valid, we use an objective standard and look to the totality of the circumstances.”); Dun-
can, 43 P.3d at 518 (describing a balancing test used to determine when law enforcement 
may stop and detain an individual). 
 60 See State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 341 (N.H. 1995) (“We cannot say that, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the trial court erred in determining that the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver was impaired.”); Commonwealth v. Janiak, 534 A.2d 
833, 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (discussing the balancing test in which courts must engage 
to determine individual rights when an automobile is subjected to search and seizure); 
State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App. 1995) (“The reasonableness of an investiga-
tive detention turns on the totality of the circumstances in each case.”). 
 61 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985) (“[T]he police are not automati-
cally shorn of authority to stop a suspect in the absence of probable cause merely because 
the criminal has completed his crime and escaped from the scene.”). 
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A.  The Supreme Court Has Consistently Preferred a Fact-Specific Inquiry to 
Bright-Line Rules in Applying the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has consistently favored case by case inquiries 
over bright-line rules in evaluating constitutionality under the Fourth 
Amendment.  In Florida v. Jimeno, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  The Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and sei-
zures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”62  “Rea-
sonableness . . . is measured in objective terms by examining the to-
tality of the circumstances.”63  In applying the reasonableness test, the 
Supreme Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead 
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”64  
Accordingly, it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence for courts to reject a bright-line rule pro-
hibiting police from conducting Terry stops to investigate completed 
misdemeanors, and instead to adopt a balancing test to determine 
the validity of such vehicle stops. 
The constitutional requirements for an investigative stop and de-
tention are less stringent than those for an arrest and are grounded 
in the notion of reasonableness, which, in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment, has never been articulated by the Supreme Court in 
concrete terms.65  As noted by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 
Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, “the question [of reasonableness] is ap-
proached on a case-by-case basis.  The United States Supreme Court 
 62 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 63 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
 64 Id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (reversing the Florida Supreme 
Court’s adoption of a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a sei-
zure and emphasizing that the proper inquiry necessitates consideration of “all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the encounter”); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572–73 
(1988) (“Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties . . . we adhere to our 
traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the po-
lice conduct in question did not amount to a seizure.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
506–07 (1983) (“Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be endless 
variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the 
courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable an-
swers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 65 See Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 115 (Miss. 1999) (“The test is thus one 
of reasonableness, and neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated a concrete rule to determine what circumstances justify an investigatory stop.”); 
see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 817 (1996) (“[T]he decision to stop an 
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic vi-
olation has occurred. . . . [E]very Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reason-
ableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”). 
Apr. 2010] HENSLEY AND COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS 1203 
 
 
has stated that, as a general rule, ‘the decision to stop an automobile 
is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a 
traffic violation has occurred.’”66
In Adams v. Williams, the Court discussed the importance of police 
discretion: 
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the 
precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to 
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to es-
cape.  On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of 
good police work to adopt an intermediate response.  A brief stop of a 
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain 
the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be 
most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.67
Thus, in order to make decisions about investigatory detentions that 
are consistent with the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth 
Amendment, courts should apply a test balancing “the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance 
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion”68 in de-
termining the constitutionality of Terry stops to investigate past mis-
demeanors. 
B.  Application of the Balancing Test Would Allow Courts to Uphold Terry 
Stops to Investigate Completed Misdemeanors in Cases When There Is a 
Threat to Public Safety 
Extending the Court’s holding in Hensley to apply to completed 
misdemeanors, as well as to completed felonies, would allow courts to 
differentiate between cases based on whether or not there is a threat 
to public safety, instead of forcing them to distinguish based on a le-
gal characterization which may or may not have any relevance to 
whether the safety of the public is at risk.  A totality of the circum-
stances approach would allow courts to balance the government’s 
and individual’s interests, and reach a conclusion in light of the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of each case.69  The standard of per-
 66 Floyd, 749 So. 2d at 115 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 810). 
 67 407 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1972) (internal citation omitted).  See also David S. Rudstein, White 
on White:  Anonymous Tips, Reasonable Suspicion, and the Constitution, 79 KY. L.J. 661, 666 
(1991) (discussing the Court’s holding in Adams that “reasonable suspicion can be based 
upon information supplied by another person, provided that the information carries suf-
ficient ‘indicia of reliability’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Adams, 407 U.S. at 147)). 
 68 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). 
 69 Cf. Sameer Bajaj, Note, Policing the Fourth Amendment:  The Constitutionality of Warrantless 
Investigatory Stops for Past Misdemeanors, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (2009) (arguing 
that “warrantless police stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are constitutional 
only when employed to defuse an ongoing danger”); Rachel S. Weiss, Note, Defining the 
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missibility, as articulated in Terry, should be whether the police officer 
is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] in-
trusion.”70
In a contrary line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota 
held that all vehicle stops to investigate past misdemeanors violate the 
Fourth Amendment.71  In Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the 
court stated, “[w]hile we can envision situations where an automobile 
stop could advance the public interest to a greater degree than the 
present stop, we do not believe this will arise in a misdemeanor con-
text with sufficient frequency to appreciably advance the public in-
terest in solving past crimes.”72  However, there have been many 
cases, including State v. Myers, in which exactly such a situation oc-
curred.73  In Myers, the court wrote: 
We have a scenario apparently involving a driver who left the scene of an 
accident.  Damage was caused, perhaps intentionally, to government 
property.  At the very least, we are dealing with an impaired or non-
attentive driver who might have been dangerous to other traffic.  The 
safety of the motoring public and the potential capacity of the automo-
bile to inflict serious damage provides a fairly strong government inter-
est.74
State v. Blankenship is another case involving a misdemeanor in 
which the governmental interest in protecting the public significantly 
outweighed the individual’s interest in personal security.  In 
Blankenship, the defendant had left the scene of the accident before 
the police could arrive.  However, the victim provided information 
which led the police to stop the defendant, at which time the officer 
determined that the defendant was intoxicated.75  The Tennessee 
Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the officer was justified, 
based on the information provided, in stopping the defendant’s vehi-
cle to investigate a completed misdemeanor, because the intoxicated 
Contours of United States v. Hensley:  Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemean-
ors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321, 1348–49 (2009) (arguing for a dangerous-driving exception 
to a per se approach against all Terry stops for completed misdemeanors). 
 70 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 71 See Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“[V]ehicle stops to investigate completed misdemeanors violate the fourth amendment 
of the United States Constitution.”). 
 72 Id. at 883. 
 73 See State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing a case involving a 
traffic stop of a vehicle following a completed misdemeanor and the ways in which the 
driver could have harmed the public). 
 74 Id. at 704. 
 75 State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). 
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driver posed a threat to other drivers and pedestrians.76  Due to the 
significant threat that a reckless or intoxicated driver can pose to the 
safety of the public, it is important for officers to be allowed to inves-
tigate cases, including completed misdemeanors, in which the safety 
of the public is at risk as a result of such criminal activity. 
It is true that some completed misdemeanors pose no resulting 
risk to the safety of the public, and it is for just this reason that courts 
should use a balancing test, instead of a bright-line rule, to evaluate 
the constitutionality of a Terry stop to investigate completed misde-
meanors.  For example, in United States v. Hughes, the Eighth Circuit 
balanced the “nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus-
tify the intrusion,”77 including the resulting threat to public safety, 
and determined that “the governmental interest in investigating a 
previous trespass [did] not outweigh Hughes’s personal interest.”78  
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland aptly 
noted in United States v. Jegede in 2003: 
It is one thing to uphold a stop on suspicion of a misdemeanor, not 
committed in an officer’s presence, when there is potential for repeated 
danger, such as weaving or other dangerous driving.  It is quite another 
to uphold a stop for a completed misdemeanor when there is no indica-
tion that it will be repeated, or cause danger to others, and particularly 
when the police have the means to identify the driver.79
Thus, instead of distinguishing between completed felonies and 
completed misdemeanors, courts should distinguish between cases 
which involve a threat to public safety and those that pose no such 
threat in determining the validity of Terry stops to investigate com-
pleted misdemeanors. 
C.  There Is an Arbitrary Distinction between Felonies and Misdemeanors in 
the Context of Terry Stops 
As noted in Part IV.B of this Comment, it is arbitrary to distin-
guish between completed felonies and completed misdemeanors in 
the context of Terry stops, when both involve a risk to public safety 
and when the officer acts reasonably in detaining the vehicle.  This 
 76 See id. (noting that the information provided to Officer Cook met the “specific and articu-
lable facts” standard and “Officer Cook was justified, based on this information, in stop-
ping the defendant’s vehicle to investigate a crime,” especially given that it was “in the 
context of . . . [a] crime[] involving a threat to public safety”). 
 77 517 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 
(1985)). 
 78 Id. at 1018. 
 79 294 F. Supp. 2d 704, 708 (D. Md. 2003). 
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issue has been discussed by both state and federal courts.  In Floyd, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected a bright-line rule against 
Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, in part because 
“applying the felony/misdemeanor distinction in traffic violation 
cases would require law enforcement officials to ignore communica-
tions of other officials warning of drivers who may be impaired, ill, 
reckless, or dangerous to the public unless the officer has probable 
cause to arrest.”80  The court further noted: 
The felony/misdemeanor distinction . . . is not the correct test by which 
to evaluate whether an investigative stop is reasonable.  The question is 
not whether a driver is suspected of a felony or misdemeanor, but 
whether a law enforcement officer acts reasonably in stopping a vehicle 
to investigate a complaint short of arrest.81
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has also recognized the 
drawbacks of distinguishing between felonies and misdemeanors in 
the context of investigatory stops.  In State v. Blankenship, the court 
held that the “difference between felonies and misdemeanors is a leg-
islative, not a constitutional, distinction.  Any fourth amendment or 
Terry analysis should apply to all crimes.”82  Thus, when a police offi-
cer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant”83 
the detention of a vehicle, and when the governmental interests, in-
cluding the threat to public safety, outweigh the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on personal security, it is arbitrary to prohibit a Terry 
stop to investigate the past criminal activity simply because that activ-
ity was a completed misdemeanor. 
Several federal courts have also questioned the fel-
ony/misdemeanor distinction in the application of the Fourth 
Amendment.  In Street v. Surdyka,  
the Fourth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment should not “be in-
terpreted to prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed 
outside an officer’s presence.”  The court reached this result in signifi-
cant part because it believed that the felony/misdemeanor distinction “is 
no longer as significant as it was at common law.”84
 80 Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 117 (Miss. 1999). 
 81 Id. at 117. 
 82 757 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); see also State v. Bryant, 678 S.W.2d 480, 483 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (noting that the State of Tennessee’s “limitation on warrantless 
arrests for misdemeanors is not constitutionally required”). 
 83 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 84 Schroeder, supra note 7, at 811 (footnote call numbers omitted) (quoting Street v. 
Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
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The Supreme Court has also recognized the difficulty of determining 
how the difference between felonies and misdemeanors relates to the 
application of the Fourth Amendment.  In United States v. Hensley, the 
Court utilized the felony/misdemeanor distinction in holding that 
police may only conduct Terry stops to investigate completed felo-
nies;85 however, only months later, in Tennessee v. Garner, 
the Court characterized the felony/misdemeanor distinction as  
“highly technical,” “minor,” and “arbitrary.”  The Court observed that 
many misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than that involved 
in many felonies, and rejected the argument that deadly force should be 
permitted to effect the seizure of any felon because such seizures were 
permitted at common law.86
Additionally, in Justice White’s dissent in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Jus-
tice noted that “the category of misdemeanors today includes enough 
serious offenses to call into question” the legal distinction between 
felonies and misdemeanors.87  Thus, it is arbitrary and impractical to 
limit Terry stops by police officers to the investigation of only com-
pleted felonies. 
V.  STOPS TO INVESTIGATE COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS SHOULD ONLY 
BE USED AS A MEANS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC AND NOT AS A TOOL TO 
SOLVE CRIMES 
This Part examines the importance of considering public safety in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in both federal and state court 
decisions.  Then, this Part argues that because public safety is such an 
important aspect of the government interest element of the Fourth 
Amendment balancing test, and because no other government inter-
est would sufficiently justify the invasive intrusion into personal secu-
rity that results from Terry stops to investigate completed misdemean-
ors, protecting the public from harm resulting from a past 
misdemeanor is the only government interest that would warrant 
such investigatory stops. 
 
 85 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to 
investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted. . . . [I]f police have a reason-
able suspicion . . . that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connec-
tion with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspi-
cion.”). 
 86 Schroeder, supra note 7, at 811 (internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Gar-
ner, 471 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (1985)). 
 87 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 761 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); see also Schroeder, 
supra note 7, at 811 n.144. 
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A.  The Importance of Public Safety in Examining the Strength of the 
Government’s Interest in the Fourth Amendment Balancing Test 
In applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test to Terry 
stops, courts must balance the nature and quality of a detention’s im-
pact on “personal security against the importance of the governmen-
tal interests alleged to justify the [detention].”88  When there is a 
threat to public safety, the government has a strong interest in pro-
tecting the public from harm.89  In Grigg, the Ninth Circuit laid out 
the rule derived from Hensley regarding the constitutionality of Terry 
stops.  The court stated: 
[A] court reviewing the reasonableness of an investigative stop must con-
sider the nature of the offense, with particular attention to any inherent 
threat to public safety associated with the suspected past violation.  A 
practical concern that increases the law enforcement interest under Hens-
ley is that an investigating officer might eliminate any ongoing risk that 
an offending party might repeat the completed misdemeanor or that an 
officer might stem the potential for escalating violence arising from such 
conduct, both of which enhance public safety.  Conversely, the absence 
of a public safety risk reasonably inferred from an innocuous past mis-
demeanor suggests the primacy of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment inter-
est in personal security.90
Furthermore, in Welsh, the Court observed that the nature and seri-
ousness of an offense is “an important factor to be considered when 
determining whether any exigency exists” that would justify a war-
rantless home arrest.91  The reasoning in Welsh was not applied spe-
cifically to a vehicle stop,92 but the Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment in this case could be extended to apply to all 
Terry stops.  Therefore, it is important to consider the nature of the 
 88 See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228 (describing the reasonableness test). 
 89 See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring courts to con-
sider the nature of the offense and the threat to public safety from the past violation 
when determining reasonableness); see also State v. Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223, 1227–28 (Me. 
2001) (upholding the constitutionality of a vehicle stop to investigate complaint of previ-
ous threat by drunken man to shoot a vehicle); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 
110, 117–19 (Miss. 1999) (holding that stop of vehicle reported to have driven recklessly 
was constitutional); State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356–57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1988) (holding stop constitutional on report that suspect was involved in hit-and-run ac-
cident). 
 90 Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1080; see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229 (“Particularly in the context of fe-
lonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety . . . law enforcement interests . . . in 
these circumstances outweigh the individual’s interest to be free of a stop and detention 
that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing 
crimes.”). 
 91 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753; see also Schroeder, supra note 7, at 818. 
 92 See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (noting the extenuating circumstances that qualified it as more 
than a vehicle stop). 
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criminal activity at hand in determining the governmental interest 
and the threat to public safety. 
The importance of public safety in examining the strength of the 
government’s interest in a Fourth Amendment balancing test is also 
evident in state court cases addressing the issue of Terry stops in the 
misdemeanor context.93  For example, in City of Devils Lake v. Law-
rence, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that an investigatory 
stop, based on a call from a police dispatch that a fight was going to 
begin at a bar and a description by a witness that the defendant was 
the one involved in the verbal altercation, was constitutional: 
A law enforcement officer could reasonably infer and deduce from this 
dispatch, at the very least, the possibility that someone at the bar had en-
gaged in, or was engaging in, “violent, tumultuous, or threatening behav-
ior” with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person within the 
meaning of [the state statute], to necessitate a call for police assistance.94
The North Dakota court did not specifically mention Hensley; 
however, the “court was alert to the potential threat arising from a 
suspected past misdemeanor of disorderly conduct, which favored 
permitting the investigatory stop to quell the possibility of escalating 
violence.”95
Additionally, the Louisiana appellate decision in Myers, that a ve-
hicle stop to investigate the suspected perpetrator of a completed 
misdemeanor was constitutional, was based in part on the fact that in 
this case the government’s interest in protecting the public from 
harm outweighed the defendant’s interest in personal security.96  The 
court stated that “[t]he safety of the motoring public and the poten-
tial capacity of the automobile to inflict serious damage provides a 
fairly strong government interest.”97
 93 See generally State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223; 
Floyd, 749 So. 2d 110; City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d. 466 (N.D. 2002); State 
v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash. 2002) (discussing different examples of Terry stops in state 
misdemeanor cases). 
 94 City of Devils Lake, 639 N.W.2d at 473. 
 95 Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1079. 
 96 See Myers, 490 So. 2d at 704 (noting how a strong governmental interest exists when the 
safety of the public is at issue). 
 97 Id. 
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B.  Protecting the Public from Harm:  The Only Government Interest That 
Warrants an Investigatory Detention in the Context of a Completed 
Misdemeanor 
Because public safety is such an important aspect of the govern-
ment interest element of the Fourth Amendment balancing test,98 
and because no other government interest99 would sufficiently justify 
the intrusion into personal security that results from Terry stops to in-
vestigate completed misdemeanors, protecting the public from harm 
resulting from a past misdemeanor is the only government interest 
that would warrant an investigatory stop.100  In such a case, the gov-
ernment’s interest in solving the misdemeanor crime is great enough 
to outweigh the resulting invasion into personal security and to war-
rant a stop to investigate the completed crime. 
Even though the Supreme Court did not extend its holding in 
Hensley to apply to completed misdemeanors, the Court did note the 
differences between the government’s interest in ongoing crimes and 
its interest in completed crimes.101  With Terry stops to investigate 
completed crimes, the government has no interest in crime preven-
tion or detection because the criminal activity is not ongoing or im-
minent, “the exigencies requiring a police officer to step in to pre-
vent [the] crime are not present,” and “because the crime has been 
committed, the police have greater latitude to choose the time and 
place to talk to the suspect.”102  Furthermore, with less serious of-
 98 See Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1079–80 (stating that any particular threat to public safety is a key 
part of the analysis). 
 99 Cf. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:  
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 616 (2005) (“On the ‘government 
interest’ side of the balance, the Court examines a wide range of factors, including the se-
riousness and immediacy of the harm sought to be prevented, the degree of individual-
ized or target-group suspicion, the presence of a warrant, warrant-substitute, or other lim-
its on police discretion, the feasibility of applying individualized suspicion and warrant 
requirements in this context, the importance of the evidence or other expected fruits of 
the intrusion, the availability of other means to achieve the government’s interest, and 
the effectiveness of the means chosen.”). 
100 Cf. Bajaj, supra note 69, at 310–311 (arguing that “warrantless police stops to investigate 
completed misdemeanors are constitutional only when employed to defuse an ongoing 
danger”); Weiss, supra note 69, at 1348–49 (arguing for a dangerous-driving exception to 
a per se approach against all Terry stops for completed misdemeanors). 
101 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985) (noting that, despite the limits, a 
police officer is not prohibited from stopping a suspect of a past crime); Major Wayne E. 
Anderson, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Terry Stops—But Thought It Was a 
Violation of the Fourth Amendment to Stop Someone and Ask, 1988 ARMY LAW. 25, 28 (noting 
that the government may have a more compelling interest in a completed crime when it 
was a threat to public safety). 
102 Anderson, supra note 101, at 28. 
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fenses, the government’s interest in quickly solving the crime is also 
weaker.  “[T]he less serious the offense under investigation, the 
greater the limits the Constitution imposes on the kind of actions the 
government can take to investigate the offense and to seize the of-
fender.”103
In fact, in many cases involving stops of automobiles, officers do 
not need to utilize the Terry stop to advance the governmental inter-
est of solving crimes.  As noted in Blaisdell, “[t]he name of the owner 
of the car can be obtained by recording the license plate numbers of 
the vehicle,”104 and does not need to be learned through stopping the 
vehicle.105  Thus, utilizing the Terry stop to investigate completed mis-
demeanors in cases in which there is no threat to public safety result-
ing from the illegal conduct can result in an unnecessary invasion of 
the driver’s personal security. 
Even though the government’s interest in solving crimes does not 
outweigh the intrusion into personal security resulting from Terry 
stops, there are cases in which the government has a strong interest 
in investigating completed misdemeanors.  As discussed above, when 
a completed misdemeanor causes a threat to public safety, the gov-
ernment’s interest in investigating the past crime can outweigh the 
resultant invasion of personal security.106  For example, in Floyd, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that an investigatory stop, based 
on a description of a car made by a witness who had seen the car driv-
ing at a high rate of speed and in a reckless manner, was constitu-
tional even though the officer had not personally observed the crimi-
nal behavior.107
The court based its holding on the fact that the officer had a rea-
sonable suspicion, grounded on specific and articulable facts, that the 
defendant had been driving recklessly.108  In addition, they noted the 
strong governmental interest in protecting the public from potential 
103 Schroeder, supra note 7, at 820 & n.193; see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229; Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984); cf. Note, 
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:  Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 
664, 677 (1961) (“[T]he detection of minor crimes might legitimize only minor invasions 
of privacy.”). 
104 Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
105 See id. (noting that the governmental interest is not as great when making a stop that is 
connected to a past, completed crime). 
106 See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1079–80 (noting that a continued threat to pub-
lic safety strengthens the governmental interest). 
107 See Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 116 (Miss. 1999) (stating that an offi-
cer can make a stop so long as he has a reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity). 
108 See id. at 118 (noting that the officer had a specific description of Floyd’s car and there 
was a complaint of reckless driving). 
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harm caused by the suspect of the past misdemeanor.109  The court 
stated: 
The public concern served by the seizure is evident—a reckless driver 
poses a mortal danger to others.  There exists in such a situation an abso-
lute necessity for immediate investigatory activity. . . . To cling to a rule 
which would prevent a police officer from investigating a reported com-
plaint of reckless driving would thwart a significant public interest in pre-
venting the mortal danger presented by such driving.110
Thus, in Floyd, the government had a strong interest in investigating 
the past misdemeanor because of the potential for a resulting threat 
to public safety. 
In State v. Duncan, the Washington State Supreme Court held that 
a Terry stop to investigate a person who may have been observed 
drinking alcohol in public was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.111  In coming to this conclusion, the court “acknowl-
edged the principle in Hensley that the traditional interest in officer 
safety and crime prevention ‘may not be present when dealing with 
past crime.’”112  In this case, unlike some of the above cases involving 
reckless driving which could result in harm to others even after the 
witnesses were no longer in sight of the criminal action, there was ar-
guably no threat to the public caused as a result of the public con-
sumption of alcohol; the court therefore ruled the police investiga-
tion unconstitutional.113  Furthermore, because of the lack of severity 
of the crime, the governmental interest in solving the crime did not 
outweigh the personal intrusion resulting from the investigation.114
Thus, adopting a balancing test, instead of a per se standard, in 
which courts can take into account the threat to public safety caused 
by the completed misdemeanor, renders the holding in Blaisdell115 ir-
relevant because the governmental interest in solving crimes is not 
109 See id. at 117 (stating that the intrusion to Floyd was minimal and the interest served was 
great). 
110 Id. 
111 43 P.3d 513, 521 (Wash. 2002) (refusing to extend Terry stops to past crimes that officers 
did not witness and that did not involve a traffic infraction). 
112 United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The . . . focus on preventing 
crimes, and promoting the interests of justice in arresting felons in Hensley, suggests that the 
interest in preventing civil infractions may not be accorded the same weight.” (quoting 
Duncan, 43 P.3d at 518)). 
113 See Duncan, 43 P.3d at 521 (“Possessing or consuming alcohol in public is not a 
crime . . . .”). 
114 See id. at 518–19 (noting that, with a lesser crime, a lower level of intrusion will be toler-
ated). 
115 See Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883–84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(stating that the balancing test weighs the benefit to the public against the intrusion upon 
the motorist’s rights). 
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considered when weighing the interests.  Instead, the only interest 
that outweighs an individual’s privacy rights is the government’s in-
terest in protecting the public from harm. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment addresses the issue of whether or not the holding 
in Hensley—that police officers are allowed to conduct Terry stops if 
they have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articu-
lable facts, that a person is wanted in connection with a completed 
felony—should extend to completed misdemeanors.  The Comment 
examines the federal and state court decisions that adopt a bright-
line prohibition against such stops and the decisions that balance the 
interests on a case by case basis, and argues that the holdings adopt-
ing a balancing test are more persuasive and consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.116  The constitu-
tionality of Terry stops should be determined by a balancing of the 
individual’s and the government’s interests on a case by case basis, 
because the Supreme Court has consistently favored fact-specific rea-
sonableness inquiries over bright-line rules in applying the Fourth 
Amendment and because a balancing test would allow courts to vali-
date Terry stops in cases where there is a threat to public safety associ-
ated with the crime. 
Finally, this Comment examines the importance of public safety in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by looking at federal and state 
court decisions addressing this issue, and argues that public safety is 
the only government interest that would warrant the invasive intru-
sion into individual privacy rights associated with stops to investigate 
past misdemeanors.117  Because public safety is such an important as-
pect of the government interest element of the Fourth Amendment 
balancing test, and because no other government interest would suf-
ficiently justify the invasive intrusion into personal security that re-
sults from Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, pro-
tecting the public from harm posed by certain misdemeanors is the 
only government interest that would warrant such investigatory stops. 
116 See supra Parts II, III, and IV. 
117 See supra Part V. 
